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Foreign Labour Migration and the Economic Crisis in the EU: 
Ongoing and Remaining Issues of the Migrant Workforce 
in Germany 
 
This paper provides an evaluation of the status of migrant workers in Germany amidst the 
global financial crisis. Findings of the study are drawn from the latest available data on the 
labour market performance of native-German and non-German migrant workers as well as 
other socioeconomic integration measures of the receiving state. Compared to the 
experience of migrants in most of the major receiving states of the EU, the status of the 
predominantly low-skilled sector-employed migrant workers in Germany, where primarily the 
skilled-workforce concentrated industries of high-value products is affected, has remained 
unchanged during the crisis. On the other hand, marginalisation of the ethnic and national 
minority population appears to be a persistent phenomenon marked by long-standing labour 
market exclusion. This is manifested in over two decades of double-digit unemployment rates 
of the foreign migrant population in the former ‘guest-worker’ importing country. This implies 
for the economy the need to settle long-term problems and implement strategies towards a 
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Since the European Union (hereafter EU) fell into a steep recession in the second half of 
2008, migration has once again emerged as one of the heated issues of debate in Europe. The 
EU’s growing concern over people on the move has two main reasons:1) the EU, under the 
European Community’s Treaty of Free Movement of Workers, has the largest internal (intra-
regional) migrant workforce after the United States, which is currently estimated at 14million 
of the total 43 million foreign-born individuals in the EU-27 (Eurostat 2008, Muenz 2008, 
Rossi, Burghart 2009), 2) the foreign-born migrant population of the EU is concentrated in the 
low-skilled, tertiary industry sectors of the host economies and believed to be most vulnerable 
to the effects of the recent economic crisis. 
Germany is considered to be a particularly interesting and important case of a receiving 
country amongst the Member States due to its long-standing central position in the 
geopolitics, and the economy of Europe. Despite being a “reluctant land of immigration” 
(Brubaker 1992), post-war Germany has been one of the top destination countries in Europe 
for millions of deprived people from both the south and the east. 
 
This country report on Germany has been prepared to provide a mid-crisis evaluation of the 
status quo of migrants and foreign labour migration policies in Germany amidst the global 
economic downturn. Given the short temporal dimension to the query, key findings of the 
study are drawn from the latest available descriptive statistics on the German labour market 
and the population data that spans the years 2008 and 2009. While the primary aim of the 
paper is to address recent recession-driven problems of migration, it also touches upon more 
long-standing issues, and challenges that are related to integration and equal opportunity 
policies in the country. Integration-related issues are considered to have significant policy 





Considering migrant workers in an economic crisis indeed raises a plethora of issues that 
include changes both in actual patterns and policies of labour migration, and the impacts on 
the labour market, as well as a rise in xenophobia. All of these prevailing problems during a  
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recession ultimately lead to one central question: What are the long- and short-term 
implications of the external shock for the migrants, and the policies of the receiving country? 
 
Recent statistics on the German experience with respect to its labour market make a clear 
point against the generic claims that have been made against the labour market and migrant 
workers in the Member States since the outbreak of the global and regional (Eurozone) 
economic crisis.  
It has been commonly assumed by the media that foreign workers in Europe, particularly 
those more recently migrated from the post-2004 accessed member states of Eastern Europe 
who have settled in the once booming and liberal economies of the EU such as the UK and 
Ireland, have been the foremost victims of the crisis as they have become the first to be laid 
off and consequently homeless amidst the recession (BBC NEWS, February 23 2008). In 
quite contrast to its counterpart economies of the EU-15, an extremely grim scenario has not 
been observed in the German labour market. According to the German Federal Agency for 
Employment (hereafter BA), there was only a 0.8 percentage point increase in unemployment 
rates among the foreign migrant workforce employed in jobs that are subject to social security 
payments during the peak period of the crisis, from 15.8 percent in September 2008 to 16.6 
percent in September 2009. Quite similarly, an increase in the unemployment rate among the 
native German workforce remained at a very low level during the same period, from 7.1 
percent to 7.5 percent (BA 2009).   
 
Yet, this relative employment and unemployment stability of migrant workers in the host 
economy during the recession is not conclusive of the fact that migrants in Germany are better 
integrated into the host society than those living elsewhere in the EU. In the German case, 
long-term failings in the integration of its migrant minority population has been most notably 
seen in the double-digit gap in the unemployment rates between the migrant workforce and 
the native workforce over the past decade. It also appears to be far more significant and 
challenging than problems driven by the recent economic recession. In fact, surges in 
unemployment and the return movement of migrant workers, which have been highlighted 







The political and legal context of international migration to Germany   
 
Understanding the situation of foreign migrant workers in Germany essentially requires an 
understanding of the very complex legal and political framework of the country’s immigration 
system.  
Under the guest-worker system in the post-war economic miracle era, Germany has received 
over one million ‘guest workers’ from then labour-surplus economies of Mediterranean 
Europe. The second migration wave consisted of people from the former soviet block. It was 
during the post-socialist period - 1991-1999- in which Germany once again emerged as the 
top destination country for nearly three million newcomers that include two million ethnic 
Germans form Russia, and hundreds and thousands of political refugees from Eastern Europe.  
 
Given the early mass influx of people from Mediterranean Europe, and the former Soviet 
Union, Germany has been seen as an established immigration country in Europe.  The reality, 
in terms of the immigration policy development of the state, is however quite the opposite: 
politically and legally Germany began to change from a temporary, guest worker system to an 
active immigration system only in less than a decade, starting from a reform in the country’s 
naturalisation law in 2000. Indeed as the American immigration scholar Cornelius (2004) puts 
it, Germany is one of the “late-comers to immigration” along with the other post-1990 
emerged immigration nations of the OECD member economies (Italy, Spain, Japan, and 
South Korea).    
 
In contrast to the former laws for foreigners (Auslaendergesetz) that had primarily served as 
an administrative management instrument of its guest worker settlers, the 
Zuwanderdungsgesetz  that came into effect in 2005 serves as the country’s ‘first’ fully-
fledged, modern immigration law.  The foremost difference between the old law and the new 
law of immigration is that the new one recognises the need for an active integration of both 
the former guest workers and prospective permanent migrants into the economy and the 
society. 
The introduction of the modern immigration law has resulted in substantial revisions to the 
migration-related policies of the country over the past five years. Yet at the international 
level, many of the significant changes that have been made over the last few years remain 
under-explored. This is largely owed to the high complexity of the German legal system  
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which has often been the source of inaccurate interpretations either by oversimplifications or 
misleading translations of the varying migrant-related legislations regulated at the federal, and 
the state (Laender) levels.  
One of the key issues that has been often excluded from the cross-national comparative 
analysis is the differentiation of the intricate de-jure, and de-facto status of Germany’s 
minority immigrant population. Although the new German nationality law enacted on 
1.1.2000 allows the granting of German citizenship via jus soli or birthplace principle, 1.7 
million members of native-born ethnic minority populations in Germany remain under foreign 
national status. One of the major reasons for the low rate of German citizenship among 
second- and third-generation immigrants from non-EU countries is attributed to the limited 
jus soli practice of the German nationality law. While accepting the birthplace principle, the 
post-2000 law which created the so-called ‘option model’ German nationality legislation 
strictly bans dual citizenship and requires German-born children of immigrants to choose a 
single citizenship when they reach age 18. This has been widely criticised of putting too much 
pressure on native-born immigrant youths’ decision-making on their nationality since the 
majority of immigrant descendants have to give up either their German nationality 
(citizenship of their adopted homeland), or the nationality of their parents (citizenship of their 
ethnic homeland). Pressure on the latter has been particularly pertinent to the individuals of 
Muslim family background which has held back the integration of the Muslim ethnic minority 
communities into German society. 
 
Migrants (Migranten) and versus Foreigners (Auslaender)  
 
The seemingly simple and commonly understood term of “migrants” for aliens, which is 
known as “Migranten” in German is a rather new and unsettled concept in the German 
context.  Until the new immigration law was created in 2005, the public had not been fully 
aware of words like ‘migrants; and ‘immigrants’. Instead, every person belonging to an ethnic 
minority community in Germany was considered and called a foreigner “Auslaender” in 
German, regardless of the migrant individual’s citizenship and settlement status within the 
host society. This primarily owes to the country’s strong ethnonational identification 
(citizenship), which is embedded in the long practice of the jus sanguinis nationality policy 




The term migrants began to be used officially in the country’s population census followed by 
the introduction of the nation’s first immigration law in 2005. The latest population census 
(Mikrozensus 2007) uses the German “Migranten” for migrants instead of the previously 
used term “Auslaender”. This allowed a broader inclusion of ethnic minorities in the 
country’s official statistics. Ever since the conceptual revision of the population census, 
migrants in German official statistics now commonly cover not only the 7. 3 million de-jure 
foreign nationals, but also another 8.1 million combined for both foreign-born and native-born 
minority population of the country, which includes those who have either a direct or an 
indirect international migration background (either by being foreign-born or having a foreign-
born parent respectively). According to the new census definition of migrants, those 
individuals with a migrant background, known as “Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund” in 
German, make up nearly 20 percent of the total German population. This migrant population 
includes nearly five million “native-born”, second- and third- generation immigrants, who 
account for more than half of the German national individuals, and one-third of the total 
migrants in Germany (see Table 1, and Figure 1).  
 
Table 1 Immigrants in the new German population census  
Migrants (individuals with a migration background) 
15. 4 million  
(out of total 82.3 million population of Germany) 
German citizens  Non-German citizens  
(the de-jure foreign population) 
8.1 million   7.3 million  
Individuals with own 
migration background
(foreign-born) 
Individuals without own 
migration background 
(native-born) 
Individuals with own 
migration background 
(foreign-born) 
Individuals without own 
migration background 
(native-born) 
4.9 million   3.2 million   5.6 million   1.7 million  
Source: Mikrozensus 2007 
 
 
Despite the terminological alteration, the change does not effectively categorise the national 
population by birth place; it only replaces the ethnic origin-based, narrow definition of a 
foreigner. 
In practice the new German census definition of “migrants” specifies populations that are 
primarily based on ethno-national origin. Migrants used in the German context thus include 
“those with own migration background who are first-generation immigrants to Germany  
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having made the move themselves”, and also “those without their own migration history, but 
have ancestors immigrated to Germany”. This categorisation defined by the new German 
immigration law, and population census reflects a combination of both jus sanguinis 
(citizenship right by blood), and jus soli (citizenship right by place of birth) approaches which 
is in turn is not equivalent to the international (OECD) standard definition of ‘foreign-born 
population’ that solely draws from the jus soli principle for categorising immigrant 
populations.   
Thus, if one were to employ the international standard of immigrant categorisation, 
Germany’s foreign-born (immigrant) population consists of by 10.5 million individuals (see 




Figure 1 Share of each ethnic and national minority group in Germany's total migrant 
               population  
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 Source: German microcensus (2007) et al. Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (2009)  
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In general, the Microcensus and the Federal Statistical Office, which are two of the key 
authorities for generating and analysing data on the nation’s population, employ the broad 
definition of migrants. In contrast, the Central Registrar of Foreigners and the BA stick to the 
narrower categorisation of foreign national residents. For example, unless stated as an 
exception, analyses of the labour market performance of immigrants and their presence in the 
state’s social security system provided by the two governmental agencies are limited to non-
German citizens.  
Thus, although this broader categorisation of the migrant population in the new census serves 
to better analyse the status of approximately 2.8 million German descendants from the Soviet 
Union who were granted German citizenship by return law of the state, but perceived as an 
immigrant minority group in the host society, the new definition of “migrants” in the 
population statistics, and the public debate over immigrants in the country is widely open to 
scrutiny.   
In this study, unless otherwise stated, the terms “migrant population”, or “migrant 
individuals” are used in the broad context of immigrants as defined by the German population 
census referring to all ethno-national minority-origin people of the country regardless of their 
citizenship status. By contrast, using “foreign migrant population” or “foreign migrant 
workers” straightforwardly denotes the de jure non-German workforce, as used in the labour 




Data and profiles of immigrants in recent-day Germany   
 
Post-2000 statistics on migration of populations into Germany indicate a number of key 
features of migration and migrants in the country which paints a dominant picture of the 
socio-economic and urban development trajectories of migrant populations in the country.   
First, Turkish-origin migrants who are widely believed to make up the absolute majority of 
the foreign population of Germany, decreased by 0.4 percent from 2004 to 2008, while 
migration from EU-10 countries has increased by 28.2 percent in the same period. According 
to the latest population census, Turks account for 16.4 percent of the total 15.3 million 
individuals having international migration background in Germany, while they make up 25.1 
percent of total foreign national residents in the country (see Microcensus 2007, et al. Federal 




Second, European nationals including individuals from the former Soviet Union and the 
Central & Eastern European Countries (CEECS), excluding Turks, account for nearly 40 
percent of the total migrant population in Germany, while they make up more than the half 
(55 percent) of the entire foreign national residents. In turn, the entire migrant population of 
Germany is dominantly of European origin, and thus not as ethnically diverse as it has been 
widely assumed. Individuals of Southeast Asian and African-origin make up only 6. 7 per 





























Table 2 Migrant stock in the German population census 
Migrant population in Germany 
(Migranten): Individuals having an 








   
Number in 
thousand  in %  Number in 
thousand  in %  Number in 
thousand  in % 
EU-27       2.545  69  1.141 31 3.686  23.9   
Among 
which:   Greece  240 62.5 144  37.5  384 2.5   
    Italy  431 56.6 330  43.4  761 4.9   
    Poland¹  529 82.9 109  17.1  638 4.1   
   Romania¹  207  86.3  33  13.8  240  1.6   




Herzegovina 217  76.7  66  23.3  283  1.8   
    Croatia  251 67.3 122  32.7  373 2.4   
   
Russian 
Federation¹  510 90.9  51  9.1  561 3.6   
    Serbia    287 73.4 104  26.6  391 2.5   
   Turkey  1.511  59.8  1,016  40.2  2,527  16.4   
    Ukraine   192  89.3  23  10.7  215  1.4  
    Europe total  5.872  69.1  2.627  30.9  8.499  55.1  
    Africa  342 71.3 138  28.8  480 3.1   
    America  233 67.3 113  32.7  346 2.2   
Asia, 
Australia, 
Oceania     
1.183 78.8  318  21.2  1,501 9.7   
Among 
which 
Near and Middle 
East  584 82.5 124  17.5  708 4.6   
   Kazakhstan¹  203  94.4  12  5.6  215  1.4   
   
South and 
Southeast  Asia  416  74  146 26 562  3.6   
Not specified    2.904  63.3  1,682  36.7  4.586  29.8   
Total individuals with  
international migration 
background 
10.534 68.4  4.877  31.6  15.411  100.0   
Foreign nationals   5.592  76.8  1.688  23.2  7.280  47.2   Among 
which 








2.756     -     2.756  17.9   
   from  Poland  518             518  3.4   
   
from the Russian 
Federation  475             475  3.1   
   from  Kazakhstan  320             320  2.1   
   from  Romania  173             173  1.1   
   
from the former 
Soviet Union  137             137  0.9   
Source:  Microcensus 2007 et al. Federal Statistical Office 2008b.  
1) Without ethnic German migrants (Spaetaussiedler), 
2) No identification of place 
of origin was possible for app. one million ethnic German migrants       
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Third, the vast majority of Germany’s foreign migrant population is comprised of post-WWII 
guest worker migrant settlers from Southern Europe who have lived in the country for an 
average of 18.2 years (or 20 years when considering the total number of people who 
originated from foreign countries). In turn, Germany’s migrant residents are getting old too. 
The gender distribution is quite even. The male-to-female ratio of foreign migrant population 
is 51.2:48.8 (Central Registrar of Foreigners 2009 et al. Federal Statistical Office).   
 
Fourth, the migrant population in Germany has traditionally been marginalised in the 
mainstream society. This is evidenced by the dominant low-income status of the average 
migrant population, thus invoking their prevalent reliance on the state’s minimum income 
support for the long-term unemployed known as Hartz IV in German. The Hartz IV, formally 
known as Social Security Code II is a revised form of means-tested minimum security 
benefits which was introduced in 2005 for the individuals who are out of labour market, but 
recognised as “active job-seekers”. The share of minority migrants among the total recipients 
of the non-contributory social security benefits has significantly increased, which currently 
accounts for 21 percent (Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs 2009). 
 
Although currently part-time foreign national workers account for less than 20 percent of the 
total foreign workforce in Germany’s formal labour market (BA 2009c), more than a quarter 
of foreign migrant workers in the country were reported to be living below the poverty line in 














 Table 4 Economic status of the migrant population by income level   
 
Among them  Migrant workforce by gross income levels  




















3,200 euros or 
more 
  
Gender  Population in thousands  
%  %  %  % % %  % 
male  7,795  93.6  27.9  43.0  28.7 49.9 16.5  4.9 
female  7,538  93.9  28.5  32.5  66.8  28.0  4.1  1.1 
All foreign-origin (migrant) 
population 
total  15,333  93.7  28.2  37.9  44.8 40.6 11.2 3.3 
male  1,995  94.5  20.0  45.8  25.7  55.2  15.8  3.3 
female 2,058  94.5  21.3  37.9  67.3  28.5  3.2  1.0 
Spaetaussiedler (ethnic German 
migrants) 
total  4,053  94.5  20.7  41.7  44.9  42.9  10.0  2.2 
male  1,992  93.9  24.4  33.7  30.0 45.3 19.1  5.6 
female  1,967  94.1  25.0  26.7  63.1  30.6  5.1  1.2 
German-born, and naturalised 
migrant individuals  
total  3,959  94.0  24.7  30.3  44.5 38.9 13.0  3.6 
male  3,809  92.9  34.0  46.5  29.8  48.9  15.8  5.5 













Foreign-born (foreign national) 
migrant individuals  
total  7,321  93.1  34.3  39.8  44.9  40.1  11.3  3.8 
male  40,339  92.5  14.3  47.1  23.0 43.9 23.1  10.0 
female  42,127  92.2  15.2  37.3  56.3  34.3  7.6  1.8  Total 
total  82,465  92.3  14.8  42.1  38.1 39.5 16.1  6.3  
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Source: Federal Statistical Office; special evaluation of the Mikrozensus 2005 provided for the Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and 
Integration. 
*Persons considered as being at the poverty line, if their per-capita net-income is less than 60% of the average income (median). The per-capita income is weighted 
according to the number of household members. In order to do so, the household net income is referenced to the weighted number of household members. The
household's main breadwinner is assigned a value of 1, all household members who are 14 years of age or over are assigned values of 0.5 and all those younger than 14
are weighted with a value of 0.3 (OECD-equivalent scale). Due to missing data, 7.7% of the population were not considered in income calculations. Equivalence 





Table 5 Share of foreign migrant workforce with social insurance in the total 
German workforce by sector 
 
Sector   Number 
Share in the total workforce 
(%)  
Manufacturing 542,760  8.2 
Business-related services including 
consultancy   288,366 8.5 
Retailing, Maintenance, and Repairing of 
vehicles  223,406 5.7 
Catering, and Tourist industry   161,509  21.4 
Health, and Social care services    130,090  4.2 
Transportation, and Communication   115,265 7.1 
Construction   98,028  6.4 
Other services   71,673  6.1 
Education, and Teaching  43,682  4.5 
Public administration   31,928  1.9 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing  30,018  9.8 
Banking, and Insurance  23,943  2.4 
Mining, Energy, Recycling,  6,624  6.3 
Domestic labour  4,285  11.9 
Total number of workforce (with social 
insurance)        1,771,577    
Source: BA (2006) 
 
 
According to Table 5, nearly half of the foreign migrant workforce is employed in the 
labour-intensive and low-waged primary and tertiary industries of the German 
economy, including agriculture and forestry. However, the domestic labour sector 
however remains highly tricky, because the figure for the regular full-time and part-
time jobs covered by the statutory social insurance does not include the undocumented 
(e.g. cleaners and nannies working illegally in private households), and those in so-
called “mini-jobs”, meaning short-term jobs with small payments. Mini-job takers are 
officially categorised as unemployed due to their short working hours and low wages 
(i.e., less than 15 hours/week, 400 Euro/month), and hence are not subject to the 
statutory social security payments. According to recent official statistics, foreigners 
make up 13.4 percent of the registered mini-job workers in the domestic labour sector, 
while the native workforce in the sector accounts for 86.6 percent (Mini-job center of 
German statutory pension insurance 2009). However, whether these figures provide a 
realistic picture of the migrant workforce in the sector is a subject of speculation since 
millions of middle class German households are believed to be using unregistered and  
 
16 
low-cost cleaner’s services originating predominantly from low-income economies of 
Europe such as Poland, Bulgaria, and Turkey. An unofficial count of the number of 
such informal foreign domestic workers in Germany ranges from 1.2 million to 2.9 
million (Focus 2004).  Whatever the actual number would be, workers in this sector 
and the service industry as a whole in the German economy are not considered to have 
been affected by the recent crisis, and are not particularly relevant to the study.   
  
Workers in jobs that are subject to statutory social security payments (e.g. health 
insurance, long-range nursing care, pensions and unemployment insurance) make up 
the vast majority of the total employed population in the German economy, accounting 
for nearly 70 percent of the 40.55 million civilian workforce of the country (BA 
2009c). The remaining 30 percent of the total workforce, which is exempt from the 
statutory social security payments (social insurance) in the economy, includes those 




International migration trajectories in post-1990 Germany    
 
Net-migration into Germany has been, as a whole, fluctuating for nearly two decades, 
starting in the early 1990s. The End of the Soviet Era entailed an exodus of people 
from Eastern to Western Europe as well as transatlantic movement. According to 
Figure 2, one can see a clear spike in migration influx during that particular period, 
which has gradually decreased since the mid-1990s.   
Since 2000, one observed a downward trend in net migration: a tendency towards 
negative growth of net migration into the country indicated by a decreasing gap 
between in-migration to the country and out-migration from the country both among 
the native and foreign population of the country. These trends have not really changed 
in the last few years including 2009, which was considered to be economically the 
most turbulent time in post-war Europe (see Figures 1 and 2).  
 
The fluctuating nature of net-migration, particularly among foreigners in recent 
Germany, may be due to the growing volume of intra-regional migration particularly 
through a massive influx of people from the EU-12 countries to Germany which  
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increased by more than 30 percent on average between 2007 and 2008. The increase of 
total international migration into the country in the same period remained at only 0.2 
percent (Federal Statistical Office 2009 et al. Central Registrar of Foreigners 2009). 
Given the geographical proximity, the intra-European Union movement involves more 
fluid and circular mobility of labour rather than long-term or permanent migration, 
which may also contributed to the shaping of the fluctuating trend of recent net-
migration to Germany.  
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     Source: Federal Statistical Office 2009  
 




                         

































































        
                      Source: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 2008 
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According to the data up to late 2008, no significant changes have been detected in the 
volume of migration and remittances towards the start of the recession in 2008. One can 
only speculate that the growth rates for the year 2009 and 2010 would be lower than the 
last two years, when the volume of remittance outflow reaches the highest level. 
However given the stable net-migration development to Germany and a lack of any 
significant change in the overall (full-time and part-time) employment status of foreign 
migrants throughout the recession, the likelihood of a substantial decrease in the absolute 
volume of remittances is low. Another variable that may influence the absolute volume of 
remittances by migrant workers is the developmental status of the migrants’ countries of 
origin. In a booming sending economy such as that of Turkey, which has been enjoying a 
high growth rate over the past several years, the demand for remittances from the country 
of destination, Germany may have been lower. All of these complex conditions make 
projections for the year 2009 and 2010 difficult, requiring a long-term observation. 
 




























Workers' remittances, compensation of employees, and migrant transfers, debit  in Germany 
(in $US million)
Source: World Bank estimation based on IMF's Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook  2008  
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Economic background: migrant workers during a recession  
 
As bearer of the largest economy and one of the major foreign labour receiving countries 
in the EU, the German case is a stark contrast to many other Member States in terms of 
the effect on the labour market as well as the migrant workforce of the country. Recent 
labour market analyses of the BA have revealed that the surprisingly stable labour market 
conditions of Germany during the global and the Eurozone economic downturn. The 
German economy has demonstrated an earlier and quicker rebound from recession 
compared to its counterpart in the EU. GDP grew by 0.7 per cent in the third quarter of 
2009 compared to the previous quarter, while the growth rate for the Euro zone was 0.5 
percent in the same period.    
 
During the recession period, the world’s third largest export-economy has experienced a 
deep decrease in its amount of production in its manufacturing industries. However the 
workforce of the general economy has remained relatively unaffected by the recession. 
Most important is the fact that the increase in unemployment has remained at a moderate 
level throughout the recession period. While unemployment rates of the entire civilian 
workforce (subject to social security) in the EU-27 have increased by more than two 
percentage points from the previous year, in Germany they have been limited to an 
increase of only 0.4 percentage points from 7.1 in the last quarter of 2008 to 7.5 percent 
in 2009. What is of importance to migration policies is that such moderate labour market 
and job loss impacts have been similarly applied to the economy’s migrant workforce. 
The rise in unemployment rates among the traditionally low-skilled, service sector-
concentrated migrant workers in the German economy remained only at 0.8 percentage 
points from 15.8 percent (427, 996) to 16.6 percent (523. 603), during the same period.  
 
 







































































































































































 Source: BA (2009c) "Labour market in figures and unemployment statistics" et al IZA labour 
              policy facts & figures (2009)  
 
 
The relative stability of the German labour force is largely a result of the government’s 
‘short-time work subsidy scheme’, which has been carried out throughout the steepest 
downturns in the export-economy. Short-time work known as Kurzarbeit in German, 
means reducing the working hours and salaries of the usual full-time employees in those 
industries and firms which must struggle to keep their their full-time, and experienced 
workers during the recession. The government (through the BA) compensates fifty 
percent of reduced salaries, taking over the social security payments of the employees 
who work for firms that are qualified to take part in the Kurzarbeit scheme.  
Currently, 63.980 firms are covered by the state’s stimulus package programme which is 
operated in the framework of the Social Security Code III or SGB III in German − a 
contributory form of unemployment benefits. This allows the crisis-affected industries to 
keep nearly 900.000 workers (BA 2009c). Individuals in employment under the scheme 
make up 5. 2 percent of the total civilian workforce of the economy. This is an increase 
of 4.2 percent over the previous year (BA 2009c).   
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Although foreign employees are equally entitled to take part in the programme, the BA 
provides no specific statistics about the foreign migrant workforce. This can be explained 
by the administrative operation of the short-time work scheme, under which the SGB III 
benefits are not offered directly to individual employees, but to firms. In these cases, 
personal details, such as the nationality of individual workforce members are not 
collected. Yet the workforce in the manufacturing industry have the largest share out of 
the total short-time work benefits recipients during the crisis, which, according to the 
latest statistics of the BA (BA 2009c), accounts for 76 percent. One can thus assume that 
the share of foreign workforce in the short-time working scheme is rather minor. In sum, 
the coverage of the short-time work scheme has to do with sector rather than nationality 
of the workforce. 
 
It has been widely argued that the stability of the German labour market, often hailed as 
the “German jobs miracle” (Krugman 2009), has been largely possible through the 
German state’s stimulus package programme. The German government’s subsidised 
stimulus package is believed to have played a crucial role in maintaining the pre-crisis 
volume of workforce in the labour market. It was widely applauded at both the national 
and international level. However, it must be noted that in this case the effect of the global 
financial crisis was limited to the “crisis of export” that has primarily affected the 
country’s large firms rather than individual workers (see Zimmermann 2009b). A clear 
division of sectors in the intensity of the effects of the crisis on the economy also explains 
why the rise in unemployment was concentrated in the medium and high-skill level 
native-work force. There was a reliance on manufacturing industries during the recession, 
where unemployment rose by a record figure of 53.7 percent compared to the previous 
year (BA 2009). Indeed, the short-time work programme is primarily designed to save the 
long-term, full-time, and largely skilled employees (e.g., technicians, and engineers) in 
the economy’s high-value manufacturing industries. These include metal production, 
engineering, electrical manufacturing, and automobile industry – which have been most 
heavily hit in the recent global economic downturn, and consequently have high share in 
the short-time work scheme that is over 25 percent on average. What is socio-
demographically important is that these Germany industries are traditionally strong and  
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dominated by a native, male workforce: 91.8 percent of workers in the manufacturing 
industries are native Germans with over 80 percent being men (calculated from the 
statistics of BA 2009).  
 
The high growth rates of unemployment in the manufacturing industries during the 
recession makes a sharp contrast to the level of unemployment rise in the service and 
domestic industry sectors that are traditionally dominated by vulnerable workforce 
groups such as foreign migrants. Those labour-intensive, and migrant and female 
workforce concentrated tertiary industry sectors have experienced a relatively minor 
increase of unemployment which was recorded at 4.7 per cent in the same period (BA 
2009). In turn, the targeted group of the German stimulus package programme happens to 
be the native workforce, who are concentrated in the most crisis-affected sectors, and 
consequently most widely benefited by the governments-subsidised job protection 
programme. 
 
Yet, despite the massive gap across the sectors in terms of the level of effects of current 
financial crisis, the total unemployment growth rates among the foreign workers during 
what is considered to be the peak period of the European recession (October 2008-
October 2009) was slightly higher than that of the native workforce, which were 8 per 
cent and 7.6 per cent respectively. In sum, a relatively subdued effect of the crisis on the 
foreign migrant population seems to be a matter of chance rather than a result of a good 
labour market integration of foreigners. The current global crisis and recession in the 
German economy have most heavily hit the skill-intensive manufacturing sectors, thus 
leaving the vast majority of the country’s foreign migrant workforce in the most labour-









Integration Measures: Implications for the labour market integration 
 
It has been widely believed that actions for integration in most of the Member States have 
been battered by the economic crisis. This also implies a presumed growth of anti-
immigration sentiment and hatred against migrants in the receiving societies. From the 
labour market perspective, integration measurers have particularly important and far-
reaching policy implications since the conditions that lead to labour market exclusion 
entail a broader marginalisation of minority individuals in the host society.  
 
According to the MIPEX- Migrant Integration Policy Index (2006) that provides a 
comprehensive assessment on integration policies for Third-country nationals in Europe, 
“integration rests on the concept of ‘equal opportunities’ for all in both social and civic 
terms. In socio-economic terms, migrants must have equal opportunities to lead just as 
dignified, independent and active lives as the rest of the population. In civic terms, all 
residents can commit themselves to mutual rights and responsibilities on the basis of 
equality” (MIPEX 2007:4).  
      
Given the multifaceted nature of the migrants’ exclusion from the labour market, it is 
particularly important to consider the scope and limitation of the German non-
discrimination law for the ethnic minority group. Germany’s failure to meet the May 1
st, 
2004 deadline to transpose the European Union’s anti-discrimination law which is 
officially known as  the EU ‘Racial Equality Directives’, into its national law is one of 
the few publicly known and minor examples of the country’s battle over policies of equal 
opportunities and diversity management.  
 
One  of the most salient features of the German General Equal Treatment Act 
(Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz or AGG in German) is that the law does not cover 
discrimination against those of national minorities. Consequently, it has limited effects on 
ensuring equal opportunities for ethno and national minority migrants and their pathways 
to the labour market, as shown by the very low level of labour market accessibility, and 
low participation rates among non-EU national migrant settlers. Another persistent and  
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major problem that hampers the labour market access of migrants in Germany is known 
as “lacking recognition of foreign qualifications”. The MIPEX’s measurement of 
integration policies for migrants in Europe demonstrates particularly unfavourable 
conditions in Germany for labour market access and equality policies against the 
discrimination of minority migrants. Each policy dimension scored 50 percent of a total 
100 percent performance, showing a large gap as compared to some of the most diverse 
and liberal immigration economies of the EU such as the UK and Sweden.    
 
The German approach to equality policies  provides a sharp contrast to the non-
discrimination legislations practised in the Anglo-American immigration systems where 
diversity management is a key element of equal opportunity policies. In the latter case, a 
variety of legislations are practised not only to protect exclusion but also to actively 
promote inclusion of ethnic and national minority workers in every aspect of 
employment.  For example the UK’s ‘Race Relations Act’ that incorporates the European 
Union Racial Equality Directives. These directives have a statutory definition of direct 
and indirect discrimination and harassment against anyone on the grounds of nationality 
including citizenship apart from race and colour, while all public job announcements 
include a note on the equal opportunity employer principle that encourages applicants 
from ethnic minority backgrounds. 
     
Similarly the United States has the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEO) 
that rules federal laws to protect all manner of vulnerable workers including people of 
ethnic and national minority origin. The US Department of Justice also runs a special 
counsel for so-called ‘Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices’. Diversity 
management is secured by multiple equality-related legislative systems in the established 
immigration nations, which are missing in Germany. 
 
It is important to note that the German AGG’s is practised by the ‘prevention’ principle 
of overt forms of discrimination and harassment that focuses on the traditionally 
marginalised groups of the society − women and elderly − rather than the ‘promotion’ of 
diversity. Indeed, both the prevention-focused non-discrimination law and the Hartz- 
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reform 2005 – an act carried out to modernise the labour market and social security 
policies of the German welfare system − remain to prioritise counteracting ageism and 
sexism. In consequence, both legislations have a relatively limited influence on the active 
inclusion of the ethnic and national minority workforce.  
Since the German equality law does not have specify and mandate nationality-related 
discrimination and equal employment opportunity policies,  German employers are 
particularly encouraged to support foreign applications leading to limited recruitment of a 
non-German and non-EU workforce. To boost labour market participation of the 
minority, and third-country national migrant workforce in the country, the present AGG 
law should enhance its diversity management element. Furthermore, a revised law should 
include and improve work permission-related regulations of the national immigration law 




Migration policy responses in the crisis 
 
Despite the strong anti-immigration position of the conservative party that has been 
traditionally powerful in the German politics, the current centre-right government has 
been active to revise immigration-related legislations. The aim of such active approach 
has been managing quality immigration that the ageing knowledge economy needs in 
order to sustain its development. Such concern is clearly beyond the capabilities of 
current economic downturn.  
The former guest-worker importing country is seeking long-term strategies to manage 
skilled migration instead of a short-term response to its existing low-skilled migrant 
settlers. This is well supported by the major policy changes announced by the Federal 
Ministry of Labour, and Social Affairs between 2008 and 2009. In May 2009, the 
German government called for “action to ensure to bring the best brains into the German 
labour market” which later turned into the new law known as Labour Migration Control 




According to the new Labour Migration Control Act (hereafter LMCA), which works in 
line with the German immigration law (Zunwanderungsgesetz), highly qualified workers 
from the new member states (EU-12) and third countries have the right to seek permanent 
residency (Niederlassungserlaubnis) in Germany, under certain conditions required by 
the immigration authority. Such conditions include a professional position offered by the 
German employer with the minimum annual salary of 66,000 euro.  
Under the article 19 of the revised immigration legislation for highly skilled foreign 
workers (Auftenthaltsgenemigung fuer Hochqualifizierte), the qualified foreign applicant 
can also bring their family members into the country. This was not possible in the earlier 
German foreign labour migration policies such as the green-card agenda that the Social 
Democratic (SPD) government ambitiously initiated in 2000. This practically ended in 
2003 due to its failing approach to meet the long-term needs of the highly skilled foreign 
workers in the country’s IT industry from third countries. 
 
Yet the policy movement towards a liberal, immigration economy that attracts skilled 
labour appears to be volatile. The German government announced amidst the recession 
that it will extend restrictions on the free mobility of workers from EU-12 new member 
states further until year 2011 (Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs 2009b). 
This is seen as problematic, since a prolonged control over the free movement of workers 
from the new member states is inconsistent with the state’s recent commitment to ease 
the immigration of highly skilled international migrant workers to the country as 
delineated in the regulations of the LMCA (Kahanec and Zimmermann 2009). On the 
other hand, this could be due to the fact that the German government is wary of the 
potential for an extended influx of unskilled but costly workforce rather than highly 
skilled workers from the transition economies, which was the case when the government 
opened the door for return migration of ethnic Germans, and refugees from the former-
Soviet Union in the 1990s.  
 
In sum, none of the current immigration policies of the German government appears to be 
targeting the recent economic crisis. Instead the German government has recently revised 
legislations to better manage foreign economic migrants which are targeted towards the  
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sustainable development of an aged knowledge economy. This will require long-term 
observations in order to evaluate its impacts on the economy and the migrant populations 






The analysis of the recent labour market performance and the integration measurers in 
Germany shows a stark contrast to other member states that are heavily affected by the 
current crisis and have taken actions to restrict influx of foreign labour migration. Some 
countries have even decided to repatriate any remaining unemployed migrant workers to 
their home countries, as a presumably fast-track instrument to help their declining 
economies.   
 
Uneven macroeconomic developments and foreign labour migration histories among the 
member economies of the enlarged EU appear to have divergent consequences of the 
current economic crisis on migrants and migrant policies in the member state of the EU. 
The current recession is particularly sensitive to sectors. The German experience 
demonstrates a substantial disparity in terms of the level of labour market impacts on its 
workforce between the high-value added export-manufacturing and non-manufacturing, 
tertiary sectors. Indeed the disparity between macroeconomic structures of the member 
states and, a subsequent gap in the labour market stability across the economies of the EU 
seem to have a profound influence on the status of the migrant workforce as well as 
migration policy responses. Recent German experience well proves this well: despite its 
long practice of restrictive and passive approaches to foreign migration, labour migration 
from the EU-10 countries to the economy have continued to increase and the migrant 






Future policy implications at the national and the EU level   
 
Despite the upswing signs of the export-economy that were drawn amid the recession, 
findings of this study are to be tentative. This owes to the essentially precarious future of 
the global economic development over the next coming months and years as well as the 
unexpected subsequent responses of migrant workers to them. However what is more 
difficult to speculate upon the potential responses of migrants towards changing 
conditions of the labour market that include the host economy’s policies on foreign 
workforce.   
 
Experts on the German national labour market have continued to predict that the current 
upswing of the economy can turn into a negative development of its labour market in the 
coming years (Just et al. 2009, BA, 2010, Zimmermann, 2009). One of the most trickiest 
and most uncertain issues for the post-crisis German labour market appears to be the 
potentially detrimental consequences of the state’s major stimulus package− short-time 
work scheme − which the German government has recently decided to extend for another 
two years (Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affaires 2009c).  Indeed, concerns 
over deepening productivity decline through the prolonged practice of the short-time 
labour of millions of workers and the increasing costs of the state are growing (Schneider 
2009. et al. Zimmermann 2009). An underlying risk is protecting jobs that are not viable 
in the post-crisis, recovered economy that can in the long turn interrupt the natural flow 
of labour from marginal to high-productivity jobs (Pignal, Schaefer 2010). In the end, this 
may have a counter-impact on the German government’s currently liberalising policy to 
attract highly skilled foreign migrants.  Nonetheless, given the limited time of the 
investigation, and the far more intricate and tardier integration process of the foreign 
migrant workforce into the labour market of the host economy, it would be impetuous to 
provide a clear-cut assessment of the state’s policies on foreign labour migration in the 
recession.  
 
Indeed, the mechanism of labour migration development is far more complex than the 
economic development process itself.  Human movement is not always directed towards  
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materially better-off places. In contrast, the migration of human agency involves multiple 
decision-making processes that are much more complex and slower to react to an external 
shock unlike the mobility of goods and capital. The foremost examples are unnoticed 
change in the flow of remittances, and (self-motivated) return migration to the migrants’ 
countries of origin over the past one-and-a-half years; these are most evident in less 
crisis-affected macroeconomies such as Germany, even without well-established 
integration measures. In a similar sense, regardless of the skill-level, migrant populations 
that are relatively old and have long-term residency status tend to be less sensitive to 
short-term economic downturns, and consequently much tardier, as is the case of migrant 
settlers in Germany. 
  
Yet for Germany, the non-crisis effect on migrants does not mean less work. The country 
is faced with the more demanding challenge of tackling the wide gaps in employment and 
social cohesion that have prevailed for decades between the ethno-national minority 
migrant, and the native population, and which affect the everyday life of the minority 
members of the society.  
 
What remains most vital beyond the current economic crisis for most of the previously 
low-skilled temporary-worker only receiving economies of the EU is to develop more 
efficient strategies that will bring positive consequences over the long-term. Germany, 
which faces the double challenges of counteracting the long-lasting marginalisation of its 
ethnic minority population, and attracting more skilled foreign workers, will have to 
make further reforms in its existing immigration and equality policies. This means 
constructing a more liberal, diversity-valued socio-legal system that attracts the highly 
skilled foreign workforce that the aged knowledge economy has long sought after.  
 
We have seen the detrimental consequences of the early German guest-worker politics, 
which stuck rigidly to the employer- and demand-driven low-skilled migration system. 
The guest-worker recruiting system which offered little long-term and future prospects to 
the migrants in the host society resulted in today’s deep division between the troubled 
foreigners and the ordinary citizens (Germans) in German society as well as the German  
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public’s dominant scepticism regarding any kind of foreign migration into the country 
among the public.  
 
The German challenges may indeed be a common challenge to the future of the most of 
the old and emerging guest worker receiving countries of Western and Eastern Europe. 
This further underscores the need for more active and continued efforts from all Member 
States to reach the migration-related goals of the ambitious Lisbon agenda. Sustainable 
development of knowledge-based economy and global competitiveness cannot be 
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